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A Guide to the Card Payments 
System Reforms
Introduction
When most cardholders swipe a card at a retailer 
to purchase goods and services, they are probably 
unaware of what happens behind the scenes 
between the time the card is swiped and when the 
merchant is finally paid. There is, however, a detailed 
set of arrangements between financial institutions 
that ensure that the merchant is paid and the 
cardholder’s account debited. Historically, these 
arrangements have been very opaque. But since 
2000, the Bank has undertaken a detailed analysis 
of these arrangements and their implications for 
the efficiency of the Australian payments system. 
As a result of this work, the Bank has progressively 
introduced a number of reforms to card payment 
systems which have had an impact on both 
cardholders and merchants accepting payment 
cards. Among other things, these reforms have 
altered the prices that cardholders face when using 
debit and credit cards, reducing the incentive to 
use a higher-cost payment method (credit cards) 
instead of a lower-cost payment method (EFTPOS). 
Michele Bullock*
Studies by the Reserve Bank undertaken from 2000 to 2002 concluded that the structure of 
pricing in the Australian card payments system was encouraging inefficient use of credit cards 
relative to eFtPOS. From 2003, therefore, the Bank progressively introduced reforms to address 
this issue: ‘interchange fees’ were reduced; merchants were permitted to reflect the cost of 
different payment instruments in their prices to consumers; and merchants were provided with 
more freedom to choose the payment instruments they accept. the effect of these changes was 
to increase the price to cardholders of using a credit card relative to eFtPOS, thereby reducing 
the incentive to use the more costly payment instrument (credit card) over the less costly one 
(eFtPOS) and reducing the overall cost of the payments system. the reforms also strengthened 
the ability of merchants to put downward pressure on the fees they pay when they accept cards.
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This article provides a non-technical summary of the 
reasons for the reforms, the reform process and their 
impact.
Essential Concepts
There are a number of essential concepts that 
underpin any explanation of the card payments 
system reforms. These are payment systems, 
interchange fees, and no-surcharge and honour-
all-cards rules.
Payment systems
Payment systems are arrangements between 
financial institutions that allow their customers to 
make payments to, and receive payments from, other 
people without using cash. The person making the 
payment has his/her account at a financial institution 
debited and the person receiving the payment has 
his/her account at a financial institution credited. In 
order to achieve this, financial institutions must be 
able to communicate with, and make payments to, 52 ReSeRve BAnk OF AuStRAliA
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one another on behalf of their customers. Typically, 
therefore, payment systems involve four different 
parties:
  • the person making the payment (payer); 
  • the person receiving the payment (recipient); 
  • the payer’s financial institution; and
  • the recipient’s financial institution. 
Examples of payment systems in Australia include 
cheques, debit and credit cards, BPAY and direct 
credits and debits. These systems are used to make 
non-cash payments between individuals, from 
individuals to businesses and government, between 
businesses, and from businesses and government 
to individuals. 
Interchange fees
Financial institutions typically charge fees to their 
customers for payment services. Customers making 
payments (such as cardholders) are charged by 
their financial institution in a variety of ways. In the 
case of payments from a deposit account (such as 
cheques, debit cards and BPAY), financial institutions 
typically charge a monthly account-keeping fee and, 
sometimes, a fee per transaction (or for transactions 
above a certain number). In the case of payments 
using a credit card, financial institutions usually 
charge an annual fee rather than a per transaction 
fee, and interest is charged on borrowings that are 
not repaid by a specified due date.
Customers receiving payments (such as merchants 
providing goods and services) are also typically 
charged by their financial institutions. The fees 
paid by merchants usually depend on the payment 
method. But for credit and debit cards (the focus of 
the Bank’s reforms) merchants are usually charged a 
‘merchant service fee’ for every card payment they 
accept. Some merchants are also charged a fee by 
their financial institution to rent a terminal to accept 
the cards.
There is, however, an important feature of the 
way credit and debit card payments are priced. 
In addition to customers paying fees to financial 
institutions, financial institutions also pay fees to one 
another. These fees are known as ‘interchange fees’. 
Interchange fees are often not obvious – cardholders 
and merchants do not typically see them. But they 
have an impact on the fees that cardholders and 
merchants pay. 
Furthermore, in Australia, interchange fees work 
differently in the international (MasterCard and 
Visa) card schemes and the local debit card system 
(EFTPOS). In the MasterCard and Visa card schemes, 
interchange fees are paid by the merchant’s financial 
institution to the cardholder’s financial institution 
every time a payment is made using a MasterCard 
or Visa card (Figure 1). This has two effects. First, 
the merchant’s financial institution will charge 
the merchant for the cost of providing it with the 
acceptance service plus the fee that it must pay to 
the card issuer (the interchange fee). The higher 
the interchange fee, the more the merchant pays 
to accept a card payment. Second, since the card 
issuer is receiving a fee from the merchant’s financial 
institution every time its card is used, it does not 
need to charge its customer – the cardholder – as 
much. The higher the interchange fee, therefore, the 
less the cardholder has to pay. In effect, the merchant 
is meeting some of the card issuer’s costs which can 
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this rule did not prohibit merchants from providing 
a discount to customers who paid with cash, it 
prohibited them from charging more for cards 
that were more costly to accept. This meant that 
when using a card, customers did not know that 
some payment methods were more expensive for 
merchants to accept than others because customers 
using more expensive payment methods were 
paying the same price as customers using less 
expensive payment methods. 
Honour-all-cards rule 
A second rule imposed by card schemes on 
merchants was a requirement that if a merchant 
takes one type of card issued with a particular 
scheme’s brand, it must take all cards associated 
with that brand. For example, if a merchant accepted 
MasterCard credit cards, it was also required to accept 
MasterCard debit cards, MasterCard pre-paid cards, 
and any other type of card with a MasterCard brand. 
This is known as the honour-all-cards rule. Since the 
schemes already had a large number of merchants 
accepting their credit cards, this rule ensured that 
any new products would automatically have a large 
acceptance base. This provided the schemes with 
an advantage over other schemes that might have 
to build up the number of merchants accepting 
their cards from scratch. And since acceptance was 
mandatory, it also meant that the schemes could 
charge a relatively high price to merchants accepting 
the new product. 
The Policy Issues
When the Reserve Bank started to focus on practices 
in card payment systems in 2000, two main issues 
arose: prices of using the different types of cards 
did not appear to reflect their costs; and restrictions 
on merchants appeared to be inhibiting merchants’ 
bargaining power over the fees they paid. 
Prices and costs
In 2000, cardholders were typically paying 
transaction fees to use EFTPOS but there were no 
In contrast to the fees charged in the international 
card schemes, in the Australian EFTPOS system, 
the cardholder’s financial institution pays the 
merchant’s financial institution every time there is 
an EFTPOS transaction (Figure 2). This also has two 
effects. First, it increases the cost to the cardholder’s 
financial institution and, potentially, the fee paid 
by the cardholder to use EFTPOS. The higher the 
interchange fee, the more the customer is likely 
to be charged to use EFTPOS.  Second, since the 
merchant’s financial institution is receiving a fee 
from the card issuer, it does not need to charge 
the merchant as much. The higher the interchange 
fee, the less the financial institution has to recover 
from its merchant customer and, if the fee is high 
enough, the merchant could even receive a fee 
from its financial institution. In effect, in this case, 
the cardholder is meeting some of the costs of the 
merchant’s financial institution. 
No-surcharge rule
The international card schemes, including 
MasterCard and Visa but also others such as 
American Express and Diners Club, have historically 
imposed rules on merchants that accept their cards. 
One of these is often known as a no-surcharge rule. 
This rule prohibited merchants from charging more 
for accepting the card of a particular scheme than 
for other payment instruments. While in Australia 
Figure 2
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transaction fees for credit cards. That is, it often cost 
cardholders more to use their EFTPOS card than it 
did to use their credit card. Most financial institutions 
charged cardholders for EFTPOS transactions above 
a certain number a month. A fairly typical account 
offered 8 fee-free transactions a month and then 
every EFTPOS transaction above that number cost 
the cardholder 50 cents. On the other hand, for 
cardholders who paid off their credit card balance 
by the due date, there were no fees on transactions. 
Furthermore, if they received an interest-free period 
and loyalty points, cardholders were receiving 
benefits from undertaking credit card transactions. 
In these circumstances, cardholders were effectively 
being paid to use a credit card.
This difference in effective prices was not necessarily 
a concern if it was more costly to financial institutions 
to provide EFTPOS transactions than credit card 
transactions. Normally, goods or services that cost 
more to produce have higher prices and consumers 
then need to decide whether they receive enough 
benefit from the higher cost product to justify paying 
the higher price. But data collected by the Bank 
suggested that the cost to financial institutions of an 
EFTPOS transaction was less than the cost of a credit 
card transaction. This meant that cardholders were 
paying more to use the lower cost payment method 
– EFTPOS – than to use the higher cost payment 
method – credit cards. It was therefore possible that 
consumers were using credit cards more frequently, 
and EFTPOS less frequently, than they would if prices 
more closely reflected costs. Consequently, the 
cost of making payments was higher than it might 
otherwise be.
The main reason for this apparent inconsistency 
was interchange fees. As noted above, in credit card 
systems, the merchant’s bank pays the cardholder’s 
bank a fee every time a credit card is used. In 2000, 
this fee was around 1 per cent of the value of the 
transaction. So for a $100 transaction, a card issuer 
would receive a payment of $1 from the merchant’s 
bank. This was $1 of revenue that the card issuer 
could use to offset costs and it could therefore lower 
the price it charged to cardholders or offer such 
benefits as loyalty points. In the EFTPOS system, 
on the other hand, the cardholder’s bank paid the 
merchant’s bank around 20 cents every time a 
cardholder made an EFTPOS transaction. Card issuers 
therefore typically sought to charge cardholders 
when they used EFTPOS. 
So why were interchange fees set in such a way 
that they generated these outcomes? In the case 
of EFTPOS interchange fees, the explanation 
was relatively simple. The fees had been set by 
negotiation when the system was established in the 
1980s to provide an incentive to merchants to install 
EFTPOS terminals. To change the arrangements 
required around 8 financial institutions and 
merchants to renegotiate their bilateral agreements 
with one another, a task that had proved impossible. 
In the case of credit card interchange fees, the 
explanation was more complicated. In these systems, 
interchange fees are typically set to encourage 
financial institutions to issue cards. The higher the 
fee, the more attractive it is to issue cards and the 
more benefits the card issuer can offer cardholders to 
use the cards. At the same time, merchants typically 
find it difficult to decline acceptance of cards, even if 
fees are rising. The reason a merchant accepts cards 
is to sell goods and services so it usually seeks to 
provide customers with as many payment methods 
as possible. There has therefore been a tendency for 
interchange fees to be set at relatively high levels, 
adding to merchants’ costs while providing benefits 
to card issuers and cardholders.
Merchant restrictions
The restrictions imposed on merchants by the card 
schemes had three effects. First, since merchants 
were not permitted to charge customers extra if they 
used more costly cards, the pricing inconsistency 
noted earlier was entrenched and cardholders were 
making payment choices that did not reflect costs. 
While discounts for cash were possible (and some 
merchants took advantage of this), this only allowed 
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card price. It did not allow merchants to distinguish 
between different types of payment cards on 
the basis of their cost of acceptance. Cardholders 
were therefore charged the same by the merchant 
regardless of which type of card they used so they 
tended to use the card that cost them the least – 
usually the credit card. They did not need to take 
into account the fact that credit cards typically cost 
merchants more to accept than debit cards. 
Second, the restrictions limited the ability of 
merchants to compete down the fees they were 
charged for accepting cards. There were two ways in 
which this occurred.
  • The no-surcharge rule meant that merchants 
could not use the threat of surcharging to 
negotiate lower fees. If a scheme raised its fees, 
a merchant had only two choices. It could either 
refuse to accept the card at the new (higher) 
price or it could pay the new price and build the 
higher cost of acceptance into the prices of its 
goods and services. As noted earlier, it often is 
difficult for merchants to stop taking cards if fees 
rise. The schemes could therefore increase fees 
knowing that acceptance of their cards would 
probably not be affected. 
  • The honour-all-cards rule meant that merchants 
were unable to decline acceptance of a new 
type of card product even if they thought the 
cost of acceptance was too high. For example, 
prior to the Bank’s reforms, it cost merchants the 
same to accept MasterCard or Visa debit cards as 
it did to accept credit cards with the same brand. 
It was much cheaper, however, for a merchant to 
accept an EFTPOS card than a MasterCard/Visa 
debit card even though the payment was made 
from the same account. But a merchant could 
not decline to take MasterCard/Visa debit cards 
unless it was prepared to decline acceptance of 
credit cards – an unlikely decision as discussed 
above. MasterCard and Visa could therefore 
charge merchants a higher price for their debit 
cards without being concerned that merchants 
might stop taking these cards.
Third, the restrictions ensured that the high costs of 
accepting particular instruments were passed on to 
all consumers, including those that used low-cost 
payment methods. The no-surcharge rule ensured 
that those using high-cost cards were not charged 
an additional fee so the extra cost of accepting these 
cards was passed by merchants into the prices of 
goods and services to all customers. And since the 
honour-all-cards rule allowed the schemes to charge 
merchants more to accept a new product than they 
might otherwise pay, it too resulted in higher costs 
for merchants which were in turn passed on to all 
customers in the form of higher prices for goods 
and services.   
The Reserve Bank’s Reforms
The Bank assessed card payments system issues 
a number of times between 2000 and 2006. As a 
result of these assessments, from 2003 the Bank 
progressively introduced a number of reforms to the 
debit and credit card systems in Australia. The two 
main sets of reforms were to reduce interchange 
fees in both credit and debit card systems to move 
them closer together and to remove restrictions on 
merchants. The Bank also increased transparency in 
card payment systems and allowed new firms into 
the card systems, increasing competition with the 
established banks.
Interchange fees
The interchange fees existing in the debit and 
credit card systems in Australia were affecting 
the prices paid by cardholders and merchants so 
that cardholders were being encouraged to use a 
higher-cost payment method (credit cards) instead 
of a lower cost method (EFTPOS). But while the Bank 
brought these issues to the attention of the industry, 
little was done to address them. From 2003, therefore, 
the Bank progressively imposed standards on 
MasterCard, Visa and Australian financial institutions. 
The effect of the standards was to reduce the size 
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in the MasterCard and Visa systems and of EFTPOS 
interchange fees being paid by card issuers to the 
merchant’s financial institution (Graph 1). 
The standard for credit card interchange fees, 
introduced in 2003, sets a cap on the average 
interchange fee in the MasterCard and Visa credit 
card systems. MasterCard and Visa can set a number 
of different interchange fees for different types of 
transactions but the average can be no more than 
a cap based on a number of costs that card issuers 
incur. Initially, MasterCard and Visa had slightly 
different caps since they had slightly different costs, 
but in 2005 the Bank set a common cap for both 
schemes of 0.5 per cent. This means that, on average, 
credit card interchange fees paid to card issuers are 
around 0.5 per cent of the value of the transaction, 
around half the fee prior to the reforms.
The standards for EFTPOS and Visa debit interchange 
fees were introduced in 2006. The two debit card 
systems had very different interchange fees, despite 
the fact that they were both undertaking an 
equivalent transaction – transferring money from 
a deposit account to a merchant. The standards 
therefore reduced fees in both systems. Interchange 
fees for MasterCard/Visa debit can average no more 
than 12 cents per transaction (paid to the card issuer) 
and EFTPOS interchange fees are to be between 
4 and 5 cents (paid to the merchant’s financial 
institution).1 Given how far apart the fees were to 
begin with, the Bank decided that it was likely to be 
very disruptive to make the fees in the two systems 
the same. The standards did ensure, however, that 
they were much closer together than they had been.
Removal of merchant restrictions
Since restrictions imposed by the card schemes 
limited competition in the payments system, 
the Bank set standards requiring the removal of 
no-surcharge rules and honour-all-cards rules 
in Australia. In 2003, MasterCard and Visa were   
required to remove their no-surcharge rules. 
In addition, American Express and Diners Club 
voluntarily removed equivalent rules in their 
systems; there was no such rule in the EFTPOS 
system. Removal of the no-surcharge rule provides 
merchants with another option if schemes choose 
to increase fees – they can surcharge. A merchant 
can, for example, indicate to a scheme that if fees 
are increased (or not lowered), customers using 
those cards will be charged extra. Indeed, the threat 
of surcharges might be enough to ensure that 
schemes do not increase their fees too much. In this 
way, there might be some competitive pressure on 
the fees charged to merchants.
There are no restrictions on the size of surcharges, so 
merchants are free to choose whether to surcharge 
or not, and the level of any surcharge. But if a 
merchant chooses to surcharge, it cannot mislead or 
deceive customers or make misleading statements. 
For example, merchants are required to inform the 
customer of any surcharge before  the customer 
enters into the transaction. Furthermore, customers 
should not be led to believe that the business is 
required to impose a surcharge, or that it is only 
recovering acceptance costs if the surcharge is in 
fact higher than acceptance costs.2  
In 2006, MasterCard and Visa were required to 
remove their honour-all-cards rules as they applied 
1  MasterCard undertook to voluntarily meet the same cap as specified 
in the Visa Debit interchange standard.
2  See http://www.fido.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/news_
for_business.pdf/$file/news_for_business.pdf.
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to credit and debit cards. This means that merchants 
can choose to accept, say, a Visa credit card but 
not a Visa debit card and vice versa. Furthermore, 
MasterCard and Visa are required to make the cards 
visually different so that merchants can look at a 
card and determine whether it is a credit or debit 
card. Removal of this rule gives merchants another 
tool to negotiate down the price of acceptance. A   
merchant can, for example, indicate to MasterCard 
and Visa that it will not accept their debit cards   
unless the price of acceptance is reduced. And it can   
do this while continuing to accept MasterCard/Visa 
credit cards. 
Other reforms
In addition to directly addressing interchange fees 
and merchant restrictions, the Bank also introduced 
a number of other reforms to further increase 
competition. First, it required MasterCard and Visa 
to publish their interchange fees on their websites, 
or otherwise make them generally available to the 
public. Until 2003, these fees had been hidden. While 
merchants paid interchange fees as part of their 
merchant service fee, they had no knowledge of the 
size of these fees. Publication of interchange fees 
provides merchants with more information to assist 
in negotiation and increase competitive pressure on 
these fees.
Second, the Bank required MasterCard and Visa to 
widen the types of firms that can join their systems. 
Prior to the reforms, only authorised deposit-
taking institutions (ADIs) were permitted to apply 
to join MasterCard and Visa. In order to increase 
competition in the credit card market, particularly 
in providing card services to merchants, the Bank 
introduced regulations to allow institutions other 
than ADIs to become members of MasterCard and 
Visa, and potentially issue credit cards to cardholders 
or provide card acceptance services to merchants.   
These institutions are now supervised by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
but need not be deposit-taking institutions.
Effect of the Reforms
The main effect of the reforms has been to change 
the prices facing users of credit and debit cards. The 
combination of decreases in interchange fees and 
surcharging on credit card transactions has resulted 
in most cardholders paying more to use credit cards 
and less to use EFTPOS. Furthermore, cardholders are 
likely to have found that the benefits of using credit 
cards (in the form of loyalty points earned) have 
declined. At the same time, merchants have seen the 
cost of accepting credit cards decline and the cost of 
accepting EFTPOS cards increase somewhat.  
The change in prices to cardholders has been 
the result of two effects. First, the reduction in 
interchange fees has resulted in financial institutions 
changing the prices they charge to their cardholders. 
With a reduction in the fees received from the 
merchant’s bank, credit card issuers have responded 
to the loss of revenue by increasing fees and reducing 
benefits. Annual fees have risen and the benefits 
from loyalty schemes have been either reduced or 
capped, sometimes both. This has increased the 
effective price of using credit cards. 
The price to cardholders of using EFTPOS, on 
the other hand, has declined. Many card issuers 
have introduced transaction accounts that offer 
cardholders unlimited electronic transactions 
(including EFTPOS) for a fixed monthly fee. This 
change reflects a number of factors, but the   
reduction in EFTPOS interchange fees as a result of 
the reforms has made it more viable for institutions 
to offer accounts that do not have EFTPOS 
transaction fees.
While the reduction in interchange fees has resulted 
in some increase in the price of using credit cards, 
the ongoing presence of loyalty schemes and 
interest-free periods means that many cardholders 
are still being encouraged by issuers to use credit 
cards. This is where the second effect comes 
into play – surcharging. Since the beginning of 
2003, when the no-surcharge rule was removed, 
the number of merchants surcharging has risen 
substantially (Graph 2). Survey data indicate that 58 ReSeRve BAnk OF AuStRAliA
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in June 2010, around 40 per cent of very large 
merchants imposed a surcharge; for small or very 
small merchants, the percentage was closer to 
20 per cent. Although the size of the surcharge varies 
across merchants, the survey data suggest that the 
average surcharge imposed is currently around 
1.7 per cent for MasterCard and Visa transactions, 
and around 2.7 per cent for American Express and 
Diners Club transactions. 
Of all the reforms, the disallowance of no-surcharge 
rules has probably been the most visible to 
consumers and therefore has drawn the most 
reaction. Cardholders had been accustomed to 
paying the same price for goods and services when 
using their credit card, while at the same time 
receiving substantial benefits from loyalty points and 
interest-free periods. This was an important reason 
why so many cardholders were choosing to use 
credit card rather than debit card services that would 
have been less costly to provide. With surcharging, 
the prices paid by cardholders to use a credit card 
are higher. For transactions that are surcharged, the 
benefits from loyalty points and interest-free credit 
are likely to be offset, at least to some extent, making 
the effective net price of using a credit card closer to 
that for using a debit card. And for consumers who do 
not pay the balance by the due date, and therefore 
pay interest, the price of a credit card transaction 
where a surcharge applies will be even higher. These 
changes to pricing were not unexpected. Indeed, an 
explicit aim of the reforms was to alter the incentives 
to use credit cards as opposed to debit cards.
The effect on merchants has mirrored the effect 
on cardholders. Financial institutions servicing 
merchants are now paying lower fees to card issuers 
for credit card transactions, and this has been 
passed on to merchants as lower fees for credit card 
transactions (Graph 3). On the other hand, financial 
institutions are now receiving a lower fee from card 
issuers when an EFTPOS transaction is made, so they 
have responded to this loss of revenue by charging 
merchants more for EFTPOS transactions (Graph 4). 
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merchant costs, the net effect of the reforms was a 
reduction in merchant costs of around $1 billon in 
2009/10 relative to what merchants would have paid 
in the absence of the reforms.
There is evidence that cardholders do react to 
prices when choosing which payment instrument 
to use. Surveys indicate that credit card users who 
pay off the balance by the due date and receive 
the benefits of loyalty points and an interest-free 
period undertake more transactions using a credit 
card than cardholders that pay interest on their 
credit card; the latter group tends to use debit cards 
more frequently. Indeed, many credit cardholders 
who do not pay interest do not use a debit card for 
any payments. In other words, the pattern of credit 
and debit card use appears to be influenced by the 
relative prices faced by different types of cardholder. 
While it is difficult to measure the precise impact, the 
number of debit card transactions has in fact been 
growing more quickly than credit card transactions 
over the past few years, consistent with the shift in 
relative prices resulting from the reforms (Graph 5). 
There is some evidence too that the removal of 
restrictions on merchants has resulted in more 
competitive pressure on interchange fees and 
merchant service fees, although this mostly seems to 
have been confined to larger merchants. Interchange 
fees paid by larger merchants have been lowered 
substantially in recent years and merchant service 
fees charged by American Express and Diners Club 
have declined, partially reflecting an attempt by 
these schemes to limit surcharging of their cards. 
While the ability to surcharge has been utilised by 
an increasing number of merchants, only one large 
merchant has so far utilised the ability to decline 
acceptance of MasterCard and Visa debit cards. 
Nevertheless, the removal of the honour-all-cards 
rule provides choice to merchants and hence 
provides a source of competitive pressure on the 
fees charged for debit card products.
Conclusion
The primary objective of the Bank’s reforms to 
the card payments system was to change the 
relative prices of credit cards and debit cards to 
cardholders so as to more closely reflect the cost 
of these payment instruments. Prior to the reforms, 
cardholders were encouraged to use credit cards 
by loyalty points, interest-free periods and the 
absence of fees on transactions, while cardholders 
were discouraged from using debit cards because 
they paid transaction fees. The regulated reduction 
in interchange fees and the removal of restrictions 
on merchants has altered these relative prices, 
thereby reducing the substantial incentive to use 
credit cards over debit cards. In addition, the reforms 
have strengthened the capacity of merchants to put 
downward pressure on the fees they are charged for 
card payment services.    
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